Reviving an old argument for Conditionalization
By M-Phi
Category: Mind & Ideas › Philosophy
Tags: Philosophy · Theory · Argumentation
A stubborn puzzle about the Bayesian norm of Conditionalization. I revive and refine our old argument, showing how Credal Veritism, Strict Propriety and Maximize Evidentially-Truncated Subjective Expected Utility imply you should update your credences by conditionalizing. I answer Dmitri Gallow, adapt Peterson and Easwaran, and defend the decision theoretic norm with strictly proper accuracy measu
Rolly's Take
This blog speaks to the curious intellect, the kind of person who finds solace in the intricate dance of logic and philosophy, always seeking clarity in the fog of uncertainty. It attracts those who relish the challenge of revisiting long-held beliefs and are unafraid to engage with complex arguments that dissect the foundations of rational thought. Here, the exploration of Conditionalization becomes a reflective journey, revealing the subtleties of decision-making and the continuous evolution of understanding. For those who appreciate the nuances of epistemic debates, this space invites you to ponder, question, and perhaps uncover the unexpected layers that a well-examined life can reveal.