Reviving an old argument for Conditionalization
By M-Phi
Category: Mind & Ideas › Philosophy
Tags: Philosophy · Theory · Argumentation
A stubborn puzzle about the Bayesian norm of Conditionalization. I revive and refine our old argument, showing how Credal Veritism, Strict Propriety and Maximize Evidentially-Truncated Subjective Expected Utility imply you should update your credences by conditionalizing. I answer Dmitri Gallow, adapt Peterson and Easwaran, and defend the decision theoretic norm with strictly proper accuracy measu
Rolly's Take
For the intellectually restless, those who thrive in the labyrinth of ideas and seek clarity within complexity. They wrestle with stubborn puzzles, unearthing the layers of belief and rationality, often reshaping their understanding in the process. This blog invites you to dance with epistemic uncertainty, challenging you to reconsider what it truly means to know.